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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it measures the eﬃciency in the provision of public
goods by local jurisdictions applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, it relates ef-
ficiency scores to a fiscal equalization scheme designed to mitigate the negative consequences
of Tiebout competition. The data come from the 26 cantons of Switzerland (2000-2004), a
country characterized by marked federalism. Results show the equalization scheme to indeed
have a negative influence on performance, resulting in an eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ (Stiglitz,
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1. Introduction1
During the past decade, growing tax burdens have combined with ecological and equity con-2
cerns to increase citizens’ interest in the eﬃcient provision of public goods. Economists have3
been responding to this interest by trying to provide information about government performance4
that may contribute to an eﬃcient use of tax revenues. Examples of eﬃciency measurement of5
public services include Drake and Simper (2003), who examined police departments in England6
andWelsh, Worthington and Dollery (2001), who estimated the eﬃciency of waste management7
in South Wales and Worthington (2001), who focused on U.S. and English public education.8
Grossman et al. (1999) conclude that competition between U.S. cities serves to increase their9
eﬃciency, in line with the Tiebout hypothesis. As to continental Europe, Afonso and Fernandes10
(2006), Afonso and Scaglioni (2005), De Borger and Kerstens (1996) as well as Vanden Eeck-11
aut et al. (1993) examined the eﬃciency of Lisbon, Italian, and Belgian local governments,12
respectively. Specifically, De Borger and Kerstens (1996) find that the tax rate and income13
per capita have an insignificant eﬀect on the performance of Belgian local governments, while14
federal grants have a negative influence. At the country level, Afonso et al. (2006), comparing15
new EU member and emerging market states, conclude that trade openness and transparency in16
government have a positive but insignificant eﬀect on eﬃciency, while public trust in politicians17
fosters ineﬃciency.18
These studies have not taken into account one feature of federalist countries that may aﬀect19
eﬃciency at the local level, viz. fiscal equalization schemes. Fiscal equalization is designed20
to reduce horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances that often exist between lower-level juris-21
dictions to provide public goods. This reduction is achieved by payments from jurisdictions22
with above-average fiscal capacity to jurisdictions with below-average fiscal capacity. In this23
way below-average jurisdictions are to be enabled to produce public goods at average tax rates24
(Tho¨ny, 2005). Equalization schemes exist in most countries, among them the United States,25
the European Union, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland – sometimes even at the community26
level. However, little attention has been given to the influence of such programs on the perfor-27
mance of both contributing and receiving member states. Indeed, disparities in the provision of28
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public goods could even increase because jurisdictions on the receiving end may lack incentives29
for eﬃciency. The eﬃciency of contributing states may be undermined, too, giving rise to the30
well-documented equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ (Stiglitz, 1988).31
The contribution of this paper therefore is twofold. First, it measures the eﬃciency of all32
26 Swiss cantons between 2000 and 2004. Aggregate output performance indicators including33
six major public services are constructed to calculate cantonal eﬃciency scores based on robust34
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, calculated eﬃciency scores are related to the fiscal35
equalization scheme operated by the Swiss federal state both in its present and its new (allegedly36
improved) form, controlling for socioeconomic factors that also have an influence on cantonal37
performance.38
To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first contribution undertaking a macroe-39
conomic eﬃciency measurement of public good provision in a federalist country that takes the40
incentive eﬀects of a fiscal equalization scheme into account.41
This paper is organized as follows. The second section provides some background infor-42
mation about Swiss federalism. The third section contains a review of eﬃciency measurement43
methods to argue that DEA is the method of choice in the present context. The data used are44
described in the fourth section. The fifth section is devoted to the presentation of results of the45
DEA and of a Tobit model estimating the eﬀect of the fiscal equalization scheme on DEA eﬃ-46
ciency scores. The final section concludes with an outlook and suggestions for future research.47
2. SWISS FEDERALISM48
2.1. Cantons as the Producers of Public Goods49
Switzerland, a federal state with its constitution dating from 1848, distinguishes between50
three levels of government, viz. federal, 26 cantons1, and approximately 2,600 communities.51
Public services are financed and provided at all three levels, but with diﬀering authorities. While52
1The 26 Swiss cantons are Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (AI), Appenzell Outer-Rhodes (AR), Argovia (AG), Basel-
City (BS), Basel-Country (BL), Bern (BE), Fribourg (FR), Geneva (GE), Glarus (GL), Grisons (GR), Jura (JU),
Lucerne (LU), Neuchatel (NE), Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), Schaﬀhausen (SH), Schwyz (SZ), Solothurn
(SO), St.Gall (SG), Thurgovia (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri (UR), Valais (VS), Vaud (VD), Zug (ZG), and Zurich (ZH).
3
the communities act under cantonal oversight, the cantons still constitute the backbone of the53
state. By article 3 of the Swiss constitution, they are responsible for all public services that54
are delegated neither to the federal state nor to their aﬃliated local authorities. Cantons are55
sovereign governmental entities with their own constitution and separation of power (legislative,56
executive, and judiciary), resulting in an extremely decentralized provision of public services.57
Table 1 shows public expenditure on the 12 major service categories according to the three58
levels of authority. To the extent that Olson’s (1969) equivalence principle applies, expendi-59
ture by an authority also means provision. According to that principle, more than 60 percent60
of public good provision are estimated to be controlled by the 26 cantons and their aﬃliated61
communities. However, this share varies between categories; it is particularly low for military62
defense and foreign relations, which are delegated to the federal state. It is highest in education63
and health, which also constitute two of the most important overall expenditure items.
Table 1: Functional structure of public good provision, 2004
Expenditure Federal state Cantons Communities Total
In CHF Million
(1) Administration 1,918 3,299 3,637 8,855
(2) Public safety 728 5,287 1,955 7,970
(3) Military defense 4,637 157 185 4,979
(4) Foreign relations 2,427 - - 2,427
(5) Education 5,231 14,399 8,055 27’684
(6) Culture & Sport 447 1,380 2,422 4,249
(7) Health 200 12,203 6,922 19,326
(8) Social welfare 13,805 8,026 5,911 27,742
(9) Transportation 8,547 2,873 2,991 14,411
(10) Environment & Spa-
tial planning
728 1,019 3,159 4,907
(11) Public economy 4,546 1,287 512 6,344
(12) Finance & Internal
revenue
9,411 -984 1,059 9,486
Total expenditure 52,624 48,947 36,808 138,379
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 1 CHF = 0.8 USD (2004 exchange rates)
64
The Tiebout (1956) hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between fiscal federalism65
and performance of government. Similar to a free market economy, where consumers buy66
from the producer oﬀering the best performance-price ratio, citizens choose the jurisdiction67
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where they get the best ratio between public services provided and tax paid. In the case of68
Switzerland, cantonal autonomy in combination with direct democratic control through popular69
initiatives and referenda have resulted in considerable heterogeneity in the mode of provision.70
Since citizens can migrate and shift capital freely between cantons, they indeed expose them to71
Tiebout competition.72
However, this hypothesis assumes that there are no externalities and that diﬀerences in per-73
formance are entirely due to the eﬃciency of administration. Externalities (spillover eﬀects)74
exist if citizens from one canton cannot be prevented from using services provided by another75
canton without paying. They typically arise in health care, education, and culture, although76
cantons with specialized hospitals do charge higher fees to patients from elsewhere, those with77
a university levy higher tuitions, and those with an opera house often make other cantons con-78
tribute to their operating expense. As to the eﬃciency of administration, there are disparities79
that are due to topographic, demographic, and socioeconomic conditions, constituting a hand-80
icap that cannot be overcome by the aﬀected canton. Both confounding influences will be81
controlled for (see Section 4.1 and 4.4, respectively) when assessing the influence of Tiebout82
competition on cantonal performance.83
2.2. Existing Fiscal Equalization Scheme84
To overcome these disadvantages of fiscal federalism, Switzerland initiated a fiscal equal-85
ization program in 1959 to equalize cantonal disparities in the provision of public goods. Ac-86
cording to an amendment of the federal constitution (article 135), cantonal disparities are to87
be mitigated with reference to Tiebout competition, the objective is to create a level playing88
field. By 2004, fiscal equalization has grown to some 1,000 CHF mn. of payments from the89
confederation to the cantons and another 1,500 CHF mn. between them. In relative terms, it90
totals almost 3 percent of cantonal and communal expenditure. The program is geared to the91
’financial potential’ indicator, which has four components.92
Financial potential is defined to increase with93
(1) Income: Cantonal income per capita;94
(2) Tax power: Taxable income, weighted by the tax burden per capita;95
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Figure 1: Payments of the Swiss fiscal equalization program (2004)a)
Source: Federal Finance Administration (FFA)
a)For the acronyms, see footnote No. 1.
(3) Inverse of tax burden: Cantonal plus communal taxation as a share of Income;96
(4) Favorable topographic situation: Share of a canton’s non-mountainous cropland in its97
total area, weighted by the number of inhabitants per unit of productive land.98
A higher total index value results in less financial assistance. Figure 1 shows total payments99
per capita as of 2004. The canton of Zug contributed the maximum of some CHF 1,250 (1100
CHF = 0.8 USD in 2004) per capita to the program, followed by Basel-City, Geneva, and101
Zurich. At the other extreme, the 33,000 inhabitants of the canton of Obwalden in central102
Switzerland received some CHF 1,800 on average. In comparison, the extreme values of the103
German equalization scheme are a maximum of some CHF 600 paid by the land of Hessen and104
a maximum of some CHF 1,200 CHF per capita received by Berlin. These figures illustrate the105
importance of the Swiss fiscal equalization scheme.106
One also needs to distinguish between earmarked (almost 70 percent of total) and general107
payments. While general payments can be used by the canton in ways it believes to generate108
the highest benefit for its citizens, earmarked subsidies may result in gold plating of projects109
and hence ineﬃciency (see e.g. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).110
Wrong incentives of the fiscal equalization program could have a sizable influence on can-111
tonal performance and national welfare. Indeed, the existing program has been suspected of112
inducing the disparities it is designed to alleviate. Especially components No. 2 and 3 of the113
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index formula are seen to create incentives for subsidized cantons to keep their tax burden high,114
e.g. by using their tax revenue for projects that contribute little to economic growth but enhance115
politicians’ popularity (Fischer et al., 2003). In addition, cantons that are obliged to pay into the116
scheme have incentives to waste their money as well. They rather spend it on idle projects than117
give it to other cantons. These concerns have resulted in a reform proposal that passed a popular118
referendum in 2006. Starting in 2008, the share of earmarked payments was to be reduced to119
a minimum. Equalization payments are to be governed by a new formula, which distinguishes120
between resource and financial disparities. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to answer121
two questions:122
(1) Does a fiscal equalization program as sizable as the Swiss contain incentives to provide123
public goods less eﬃciently, creating a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency?124
(2) Does it matter whether transfer payments are earmarked or not?125
3. MEASURING TECHNICAL EFFICIENCYWITH DATA ENVELOPMENT126
ANALYSIS127
The characterization of Swiss cantons in the preceding section justifies viewing them as128
largely independent producers of a subset of public goods. For productivity measurement, they129
constitute decision making units (DMU) that transform inputs into outputs, with productivity130
reflecting the quality of their administration. Following Koopmans (1951), technical eﬃciency131
in the provision of public goods thus can be measured with reference to a technology set Γ,132
Γ = {(X,Y)| Y ≤ f (X)} (1)
that describes the feasible set of input and output combinations (X,Y) of a production process.133
A DMU is called technically eﬃcient if it lies on the boundary of Γ. On that boundary, it is not134
possible to produce more outputs Y for a given amount of inputs X¯; or conversely, no smaller135
quantity of inputs X can produce a given output Y¯ .136
There are various assumptions regarding the boundary of Γ. For simplicity we adopt those137
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of Shephard (1970),138
Iso X(y) = {x| x ∈ X(y), θx ￿ X(y),∀ 0 < θ < 1}
Iso Y(x) = {y| y ∈ Y(x), θ−1y ￿ Y(x),∀ 0 < θ < 1}. (2)
Here, the input and output isoquants Iso(·) define sections with strong and weak technical ef-139
ficiency, depending on the slope of the frontier, with θ denoting a scalar by which all inputs140
can be reduced without leaving the feasibility set. Accordingly, θ−1 symbolizes the scaling-up141
factor for the outputs. However, the relevant technology set is almost never known in applied142
economic research, forcing the analyst to use observed rather than eﬃcient input and output143
quantities. The pertinent methodology was developed by Farrell (1957); it has evolved into a144
distinction between parametric (econometric) and non-parametric (mathematical) methods (see145
Coelli et al. 2005 for respective overviews).146
In public good provision analysis, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the most common147
alternative. Webster et. al (1998) argue that DEA dominates its main competitor, Stochastic148
Frontier Analysis (SFA) because of the following reasons:149
• DEA is more flexible because no specific functional form of the transformation process150
needs to be specified;151
• DEA does not have to rely on price data for inputs and outputs, which often is lacking in152
the public sector.153
DEA is the preferred technique for the present investigation, in particular because of lacking154
information about factor prices. Public sector accounts are notorious for neglecting capital user155
cost, and Switzerland is no exception. The DEA version employed here is an input-orientated156
one. The objective is to determine an eﬃcient frontier ￿IsoX(y) that is defined by the most157
productive DMUs. DEA amounts to solving a linear optimization problem for a particular158
DMUc or canton c = 1, ..., 26, with an 1 × N output vector yc and a 1 × M input vector xc.159
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Maxυ,ν υ￿yc
s.t. ν￿xc = 1
υ￿Y − ν￿X ≤ 0
υ, ν ≥ 0. (3)
Here, the 26 × N output matrix Y and 26 × M input matrix X represent the data for all 26160
cantons. Thus, let a canton optimize its outputs yc and inputs xc by maximizing the distance161
between them valued using weights υ and ν. Note that these weights relate to the universe of162
all cantons and can be interpreted as shadow prices. Moreover, inputs are normalized to sum up163
(after weighting) to 1. The inequality υ￿Y − ν￿X ≤ 0 prevents outputs from increasing without164
bounds for a given bundle of inputs. ￿IsoX(y) is defined by those units for which υ￿Y − ν￿X = 0.165
Their eﬃciency score￿EFFc is 100 percent, while that of the other DMUs is given by their radial166
distance from the frontier.167
However, the location of the eﬃcient frontier strongly depends on the extreme DMUs168
(which lack comparators). One way to obtain robust DEA eﬃciency scores￿EFF is to iteratively169
exclude one DMU lying on the eﬃciency frontier. The new frontier then assigns this DMU a170
so-called super-eﬃciency score in excess of 100 percent (Andersen and Petersen, 1993). The171
larger the super-eﬃciency of a DMU, the farther away it is from the remaining units in the172
technology set. Here, if this score is more than 1.5 times the distance between the 25th and173
the 75th percentile of all super-eﬃciency values, the pertinent DMU is excluded as an outlier174
(Thanssoulis, 1999).175
In a second step, the obtained robust eﬃciency scores￿EFFct (of cantons c = 1, ..., 26 in year176
t = 2000, ..., 2004) are related to a set of variables characterizing the Swiss fiscal equalization177
program in order to address the two research questions stated at the end of Section 2,178
￿EFFct = γ0 + γ1X1,ct + γ2X2,ct + ... + γnXn,ct + ϕct. (4)
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Tobit estimation is applied to account for the fact that scores cannot exceed 1.00 (the lower179
limit of 0 is less relevant because it is never binding). Specification details are given in Section180
5.2 below.181
4. DATA182
4.1. Service categories retained183
The data come from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce, covering the years 2000 to 2004. As184
shown in Table 1, not all categories of services listed are predominantly subject to cantonal185
control. Moreover, the quality of data is insuﬃcient for some categories. Therefore, only six186
out of twelve are retained for this investigation, viz. (1) administration, (2) public safety, (5)187
education, (7) health, (9) transportation and (11) public economy (they will be renumbered 1 to188
6 below). Further, in order to exclude spillovers as far as possible, only primary and secondary189
education (without tertiary and vocational components), private road transportation (without190
regional public transportation) and farming and forestry are included in the the analysis. More191
refined adjustments for spillovers (known to exist especially in health care) were not possible.192
They are controlled for in the second step Tobit estimation.193
4.2. Constructing an aggregate output performance index194
Since outputs of the public sector are diﬃcult to measure, activity-based indicators serve as195
a substitute, in line with previous studies (see. e.g. Afonso et al., 2006). In this paper two to six196
indicators for each of the six retained categories – in total 22 – are selected to proxy the output197
of public goods provided by a canton (see Table 4 of the Appendix).198
Our selection was based on two concerns: choosing the most relevant variables and making199
sure that they cover the years 2000 to 2004 for each canton. The relevance of the selected200
variables is checked with an analysis of cost drivers in the six service categories. Thus, the201
dependent variables are category-specific real expenditure C jct, ( j = 1, ..., 6) of canton c, (c =202
1, ..., 26) in year t, (t = 2000, ..., 2004). They are related to the output indicators (Y jk,ct, k =203
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1, ...,Kj for 2 ≤ Kj ≤ 6) and a time trend (trend jt , t = 1, ..., 5),204
C1ct = β
1
0 + β
1
1Y
1
1,ct + β
1
2Y
1
2,ct + · · · + β1K1Y1K1,ct + α1trend1t + ε1ct
...
C6ct = β
6
0 + β
6
1Y
6
1,ct + β
6
2Y
6
2,ct + · · · + β6K6Y6K6,ct + α6trend6t + ε6ct, (5)
Since cantons are exposed to similar shocks, error terms ε jit are likely to be correlated, calling205
for SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation). Depending on the service category,206
SURE confirms the relevance of the selected 22 output indicators and the correlation between207
the service categories (pertinent econometric results are shown in Table 5 of the Appendix).208
With one exception, the output indicators are positively related to cost. The negative sign of β52209
(number of delinquencies) could be the result of systematic measurement error. Some cantons210
report the many petty of cases (which cause little expense), while others limit their reporting211
to the relatively few major oﬀenses (which cost a lot). These diﬀerences may induce a nega-212
tive partial correlation between expenditure on public safety and the number of delinquencies.213
Furthermore, except for the two coeﬃcients β44 (rehab clinics) and β
4
6 (retirement homes), all214
indicators are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Both indicators are nevertheless215
retained for reasons of completeness. Finally, the adjusted R2 reaches at least 90 percent, con-216
forming the relevance of the selected indicators.217
However, including all 22 indicators is not possible in an annual DEA with 26 cantons. The218
retained output indicators Y jk,ct need to be aggregated to form a performance index Ψ
j
ct for each219
service category ( j = 1, .., 6) for the DEA. One therefore has220
Ψ
j
ct =
Kj￿
k=1
Y jk,ct ∗ pjk. (6)
In this calculation, the problematic output indicator delinquencies is subjected to a linear mono-221
tone transformation such that ￿Yi = −Yi+ r ≥ 0 (see Seiford and Zhu, 2002). As to the weighting222
parameters pjk, pertaining to the two to six output indicators per service category, there are two223
alternatives. One is to use the estimated β jk from Eqs. (5). The other is to use the shadow prices224
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from the j sector-specific DEA. These shadow prices reflect the marginal cost of expanding a225
particular service by one unit produced by an eﬃcient DMU. For the ineﬃcient DMUs, a radial226
projection onto the eﬃciency frontier permits to determine the pertinent shadow prices. For rea-227
sons of consistency, this alternative is retained. The results of this calculation (with Ψ jc values228
for 2004) are displayed in Table 6 of the Appendix. While the numbers are diﬃcult to interpret229
in general, the entries for administration (col. 1) reflect size of the cantonal population served230
because the two output indicators are population and number of firms.231
4.3. Input variables232
The inputs are measured as real expenditure (CHF of 2000) on the six service categories.233
This is a widespread practice (see Afonso et al., 2006 and De Borger and Kerstens, 1996). For234
the categories transportation and health, only operating expenses are included (total expen-235
diture minus investments in new infrastructure) because annual investments contain a strong236
transitory component.237
4.4. Determinants of DEA eﬃciency238
Recall the two research questions,239
(1) Does a fiscal equalization program as sizable as the Switzerland contain incentives to240
provide public goods less eﬃciently, creating a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency?241
(2) Does it matter whether transfer payments are earmarked or not?242
The first question is investigated using three models. Model (A) relates DEA eﬃciency243
scores to the financial potential, which determines the amount of fiscal equalization between244
cantons. Model (B) checks whether this influence depends only on the size of the financial245
flows regardless of their direction. In model (C), fiscal equalization paid and received is allowed246
to have an asymmetric impact on eﬃciency. The explanatory variables are defined as follows247
(endogeneity issues are addressed in Section 5.2 below).248
• Index of financial potential (F.POT): The Swiss fiscal equalization program is based on249
this indicator, with higher value implying less federal financial assistance (see Section 2).250
It is used in model (A).251
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• Index of financial equalization (F.EQ): F.EQ is a modification of F.POT. It measures the252
absolute value of the deviation from the value α at which no aid is contributed or received;253
formally, F.EQ = abs[F.POT−α]. Note that α diﬀers from the mean value of F.POT. The254
higher this index value, the larger is the amount of fiscal equalization. It is used in model255
(B).256
• Dummies for paying and receiving cantons (F.GIV=1, F.REC=1): F.GIV equals 1 for257
cantons who are payers, while F.REC equals 1 for those who are recipients. Cantons258
which are neither recipients nor payers constitute the benchmark group in both cases.259
These variables appear in model (C).260
The second research question calls for the introduction of261
• Subsidies per capita (SUBS): This variable measures earmarked payments, which are262
suspected to induce a particularly high degree of ineﬃciency (see Section 2 again).263
In addition, the following variables serve to control for other influences on cantonal eﬃciency264
scores that cannot be controlled for in the DEA but could influence eﬃciency scores.265
• Direct democracy (DIR.DEM): The degree of direct democratic control (popular initia-266
tives, mandatory referenda on expensive public projects) was already found to be relevant267
by Pommerehne and Zweifel (1991) in the context of tax evasion. More recently, Fischer268
(2004) and Feld and Matsusaka (2003) found the amount of public services provided to269
be negatively related to an index of democratic control developed by Stutzer (1999). This270
index is used here as well, with the expectation of a positive relationship with eﬃciency.271
• Decentralization (DEC): Decentralized provision of public services within a canton has272
an ambiguous eﬀect on eﬃciency. On the one hand, it might cause a lack of human and273
technical resources in small cantons, resulting in higher cost of administration (see e.g.274
Smith, 1985). On the other hand, Tiebout (1956) argues that decentralization facilitates275
competition, which fosters eﬃciency. In this work, DEC is the share of cantonal expen-276
diture that is transferred to the communities.277
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• Income per capita (INCOME): This is a component of F.POT that according to De Borger278
and Kerstens (1996) has additional information content. They predict that eﬃciency of279
local government decreases with increasing income per capita because citizens in high-280
wage jurisdictions face high opportunity costs when trying to monitor the eﬃciency of281
public good provision.282
• Tax burden (TAX): This component of F.POT has additional information content as well.283
In line with Tiebout (1956), a canton’s eﬃciency awareness is predicted to increase with284
a stronger participation in tax competition. Since a low value of TAX indicates a strong285
engagement in tax competition, it is hypothesized to go along with a high degree of eﬃ-286
ciency, ceteris paribus.287
• Disparities (TOPOGR, I.STRUCT, and POP.STRUCT): These variables reflect exoge-288
nously given disparities, which are expected to cause higher cost and hence lower eﬃ-289
ciency in the provision of public services. They enter the new fiscal equalization formula.290
TOPOGR adjusts for geographic diﬀerences while I.STRUCT controls for diﬀerence of291
community size, the employment rate, and population density. POP.STRUCT denotes the292
shares of immigrants and citizens older than 80 years, with equal weights.293
• Cost of housing (P.HOUS): The cost of housing diﬀers substantially between cantons. It294
is an important component of the cost of living, which is adjusted for in the wages of295
public employees and hence influences the cost of providing public services.296
• Culture (CULT.F=1): The French- and German-speaking parts of Switzerland diﬀer in297
many ways, possibly also in terms of eﬃciency (Fischer, 2004). Thus, CULT.F=1 if the298
canton is predominantly French-speaking.299
• Year of observation (Y 2001=1, Y 2002=1, Y 2003=1, and Y 2004=1): This set of300
dummy variables indicates the year of observation (base year is 2000).301
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS302
This section first discusses the robust DEA eﬃciency scores. The assumption (to be relaxed303
below) is that the 26 cantons belong to the same universe, meaning that all cantons face the304
same circumstances in their provision of public goods. In a second step, eﬃciency scores are305
related to fiscal equalization and other socioeconomic factors of interest.306
5.1. DEA Analysis307
With the six output indicators derived from Eq. (6) and expenditures changing from year to308
year, an annual DEA for the years 2000 to 2004 can be performed. Table 2 shows the results309
for the year 2004. The robust eﬃciency scores are calculated under the assumption of constant310
returns to scale, indicating potential cost improvements achievable by a radial movement to a311
technically and scale-eﬃcient reference point on the frontier. There are two super-eﬃcient cases312
that are assigned a score of 1.00 (see Section 3 again).313
Starting with the overall scores, the rural canton of Thurgovia (TG) attains 100 percent314
technical eﬃciency (score of 1.00). Two more cantons (again rural) come close, viz. Appenzell315
Inner-Rhodes (AI, 0.97) and Argovia (AG, 0.97). Indeed, 30 percent of all cantons have a316
performance score higher than 0.90. At the other extreme, Basel-City (BS) is identified as the317
most ineﬃcient canton (0.63). Thus, its expenditure could have been lowered by 37 percent318
while still maintaining the same output level. Other urban cantons, viz. Zurich (ZH, 0.74),319
Geneva (GE, 0.75) already perform much better. However, diﬀerences between rural and urban320
cantons are not surprising. The well-known disparities caused by higher population densities321
and more complex industry structures, which by the way are taken into account in the fiscal322
equalization program, cannot be incorporated in DEA. But the second step analysis adjusts for323
it with three variables from the new fiscal equalization program to enable unbiased estimates of324
the hypotheses.325
The question arises of whether the year 2004 is representative of the observation period326
2000 to 2004. Figure 2 provides an answer, ranking cantons according to their five-year median327
values along with their estimated quartile ranges and 95 percent confidence bands. The findings328
of Table 2 are confirmed in that TG remains leader while BS consistently is last. While changes329
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Table 2: DEA eﬃciency scores, 26 Swiss cantons (2004)
Cantons Rank (1-6)a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) SD
ZH 25 0.74 0.71 0.42 0.67 0.76 0.53 0.84 0.15
BE 11 0.88 0.87 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.71 0.88 0.08
LU 20 0.82 0.64 0.74 0.91 0.63 0.67 0.79 0.11
UR 22 0.82 0.71 0.65 0.82 0.76 0.69 0.73 0.06
SZ 15 0.86 [1.00] 0.75 0.81 0.56 0.71 0.75 0.14
OW 5 0.95 0.78 0.97 0.93 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.10
NW 10 0.89 [1.00] 0.79 0.78 0.64 0.78 0.77 0.12
GL 6 0.95 0.81 0.91 0.85 0.97 0.74 0.77 0.09
ZG 16 0.85 0.95 0.51 0.69 0.81 0.69 0.92 0.16
FR 14 0.86 0.79 0.74 0.93 0.69 0.67 0.77 0.09
SO 12 0.88 0.78 0.73 0.81 0.61 0.81 0.96 0.11
BS 26 0.64 0.84 0.42 0.78 0.72 0.43 0.21 0.25
BL 18 0.85 0.68 0.70 0.84 0.69 0.62 [1.00] 0.14
SH 13 0.88 0.71 0.59 0.84 0.73 0.99 0.82 0.13
AR 8 0.93 0.64 0.91 0.86 0.93 0.61 0.98 0.16
AI 2 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.98 0.83 0.61 0.97 0.14
SG 19 0.84 0.89 0.65 0.80 0.74 0.49 0.89 0.16
GR 17 0.85 0.61 0.90 0.88 0.63 0.52 [1.00] 0.19
AG 3 0.95 0.82 0.82 [1.00] 0.59 0.95 0.91 0.14
TG [1] [1.00] 0.84 0.66 0.85 [1.00] [1.00] 0.99 0.14
TI 7 0.95 0.62 0.79 [1.00] 0.85 0.78 [1.00] 0.14
VD 21 0.82 0.67 0.60 [1.00] 0.55 0.71 0.84 0.16
VS 4 0.95 0.82 [1.00] 0.96 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.10
NE 23 0.77 0.64 0.55 0.98 0.39 0.53 [1.00] 0.25
GE 24 0.75 0.42 0.38 0.91 [1.00] 0.65 0.64 0.25
JU 9 0.89 0.70 0.81 0.88 0.45 0.93 [1.00] 0.20
No. Eﬀ. 1 2 1 3 2 1 5
Outliers 0 0 0 0 TG 0 TI
Mean 0.87 0.76 0.71 0.87 0.72 0.71 0.85
Min 0.64 0.42 0.38 0.67 0.39 0.43 0.21
SD 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.17
a Mean of the six categories, normalized by the maximum value
(1)Administration, (2) Public safety, (3) Education, (4) Health,
(5) Transportation, (6) Public economy
in ranking do occur (see the overlapping interquartile ranges), they never exceed three positions.330
One reason for volatility over time could be investment in infrastructure. For example, ZG331
shows an improvement from rank 19 in 2000 to 15 in 2004 but drops to place 23 in 2003,332
because of spending heavily on investment without charging projects to the capital account.333
Yet, comparable GL with a similar degree of volatility in performance achieved a consistent334
improvement over the five years [from 0.84 (rank 18) to 0.94 (rank 6)]. In sum, variations over335
time are too limited and unsystematic to undermine the robustness of the overall ranking.336
Another question of interest is whether the leader TG is the champion in all six categories337
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Figure 2: Overall eﬃciency scores, 26 Swiss cantons (2000-2004)a)
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a)For the acronyms, see footnote No. 1.
of public service distinguished. If this were the case, Tiebout competition would unfold with338
full vigor. However, Table 2 shows that TG has a low eﬃciency score in public safety (0.66).339
Conversely, last-ranked BS does attain an average value in administration (0.84), permitting340
cantonal government to cater to voters especially interested in administrative services. More-341
over, low overall scores do not necessarily go along with high standard errors across the six342
categories (see last column of Table 2). Bottom-ranked BS has a high standard error of 0.25343
while UR with rank 23 has one of only 0.06. Thus, small and homogenous UR can survive344
Tiebout competition since neighboring (more urban) LU has twice as much variation [SD 0.11],345
while its rank is almost the same. In sum, Tiebout competition is limited even in a country as346
markedly federalist as Switzerland.347
In a federal state, another major issue is centralization vs. decentralization. In the case of348
Switzerland, the debate has been focusing on education (see Barankay and Lockwood, 2006).349
Lack of coordination between the cantons has been cited as a reason for the rather mediocre350
performance of the Swiss educational system in the PISA study (OECD, 2006). However, these351
criticisms might be overstated. The average performance score for education (3) is 0.87 (SD352
0.09). This beats the score of 0.76 (SD 0.14) for public administration (1), which is generally353
believed to perform well in international comparison.354
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5.2. Estimation of the Determinants of DEA Eﬃciency355
Next, it is of interest to see whether fiscal equalization has an influence on the eﬃciency356
scores of the 26 cantons over the years 2000 to 2004. In total, 130 observations (26*5) are357
available for estimating Eq. (4) of Section 3. Disparities in the provision of public goods are358
reflected by the indicators discussed in Section 4.4.359
Estimation results for the three models outlined in Section 4.4 are displayed in Table 3, after360
performing tests for endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and nonlinearity. Fiscal equalization could361
be endogenous to eﬃciency because highly eﬃcient jurisdictions are made to contribute to the362
program. However, a Hausman test does not suggest rejection of the exogeneity assumption.363
Heteroscedasticity is not a problem either according to a Breusch-Pagan test. Finally, linearity364
need not be rejected with the exception of SUBS2, TAX2 and POP.STRUCT2. Several interac-365
tion terms proved significant, too; their inclusion does not markedly aﬀect parameter estimates,366
however. Estimation results turn out to be robust for the three models. Most of the variables367
have expected signs and are significant at the 90 percent confidence level or better.368
In model (A), a negative sign is obtained for F.POT. Use of index of financial potential369
that determines fiscal equalization payments therefore seems to lower eﬃciency systematically370
(elasticity -0.7) after controlling for exogenously given disparities and other variables aﬀecting371
the cost of public good provision. Thus, cantons with high financial potential may have an372
incentive to underperform. In model (B), the absolute value of payments enters with F.EQ. Not373
surprisingly, F.EQ has a significantly negative sign too, suggesting that fiscal equalization as374
such lowers technical eﬃciency in the provision of public goods. Finally, model (C) indicates375
that paying cantons (elasticity -0.084) are more influenced than receiving cantons (elasticity376
-0.024) with regard to eﬃciency.377
In sum, the evidence of Table 3 provides an answer to question (1) of Section 2 by sup-378
porting the notion that fiscal equalization undermines cantonal eﬃciency in Switzerland for379
both receivers and payers, but even more for payers, who are the cantons with high financial380
potential. This diﬀerence is intuitive because payers have more reason to respond to fiscal381
equalization with ineﬃciency than receivers. Expecting no benefit from redistribution, they382
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rather waste their money than to give it to financially disadvantaged cantons. Thus, any public383
good with a positive net benefit is provided, whereas only those with above-average net benefits384
contribute to the canton’s technical eﬃciency. Being financially constrained, receiving cantons385
want to ensure that their most productive projects are financed; they extend this list only in order386
to justify their need for redistribution. While estimated elasticities are below one throughout,387
fiscal equalization in the case of Switzerland does give rise to the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ388
described Stiglitz (1988).389
Question (2) of Section 2 asks whether earmarked federal subsidies (SUBS) have an espe-390
cially strong (negative) eﬀect on cantonal eﬃciency. Whereas general payments can be used by391
the canton where it believes to generate the highest benefit for its citizens, earmarked subsidies392
may result in gold plating of projects and hence ineﬃciency. Indeed, Table 3 shows SUBS393
to have a negative sign in all three models with estimated elasticities between -0.2 and -0.3.394
Therefore, subsidies may encourage ineﬃciency, as claimed in the Swiss case e.g. by Frey et al.395
(1994). Therefore, the new equalization formula of 2008 which minimizes earmarked payments396
has the potential to reduce technical ineﬃciency in the provision of public goods compared to397
its predecessor.398
Some of the other explanatory variables are of interest as well. Foremost, DIR.DEM and399
DEC, which capture two unique features of Switzerland, contradict theoretical expectations.400
The negative sign of DIR.DEM suggests that direct democratic control lowers rather than in-401
creases technical eﬃciency. This seems to contradict the findings of Fischer (2004) as well402
as Feld and Matsusaka (2003), who however studied the amount of public services provided403
rather than technical eﬃciency. Still, lower amounts can go along with lower eﬃciency if direct404
democracy should mainly delay (notably through referenda) planning that is ”on target” in terms405
of eﬃciency. On the other hand, decentralization has the expected eﬀect in that the coeﬃcient406
of DEC is positive throughout, confirming Barankay and Lockwood (2006) who examined the407
impact of decentralization on productive eﬃciency in public education. The negative eﬀects408
emphasized by Smith (1985) apparently are more than compensated by the positive ones due409
to Tiebout competition, which however are subject to diminishing marginal returns (see the410
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Table 3: Tobit estimates of DEA eﬃciency scores, 2004
Model (A)a) Model (B)a) Model (C)a)
Variables Coef Elasticityb) Coef Elasticityb) Coef Elasticityb)
F.POT -5.8E-03 *** -7.0E-01
F.EQ -7.6E-04 *** -3.8E-02
F.GIV -2.1E-01 * -8.4E-02
F.REC -2.8E-02 -2.4E-02
SUBS -1.6E-04 *** -2.7E-01 -1.8E-04 *** -3.0E-01 -1.3E-04 *** -2.2E-01
DIR.DEM -3.0E-01 *** -1.7E+00 -7.1E-02 *** -3.9E-01 -1.4E-01 *** -7.9E-01
DEC 2.0E+00 ** 1.1E+00 3.3E+00 *** 1.7E+00 2.9E+00 ** 1.5E+00
INCOME -2.8E-04 -3.7E-02
TAX -5.6E-03 *** -7.9E-01 -6.4E-03 *** -9.0E-01 -7.7E-03 *** -1.1E+00
TOPOGR -1.4E-04 ** -2.4E-02 -6.2E-06 -1.1E-03 -5.7E-05 -1.0E-02
I.STRUCT -3.3E-01 *** -7.2E-01 -2.3E-01 *** -5.0E-01 -2.3E-01 *** -4.8E-01
POP.STRUCT -3.1E-01 *** -5.3E-01 -2.7E-01 *** -4.8E-01 -2.6E-01 *** -4.6E-01
P.HOUS -6.3E-01 *** -8.5E-01 -6.2E-01 *** -8.4E-01 -6.5E-01 *** -8.9E-01
CULT.F -6.0E-02 *** -1.8E-02 -4.1E-02 *** -1.2E-02 -4.0E-02 *** -1.2E-02
SUBS2 2.3E-08 *** 8.8E-02 1.5E-08 *** 5.6E-02 1.3E-08 *** 5.0E-02
TAX2 3.1E-05 *** 4.8E-01 3.2E-05 *** 4.9E-01 3.9E-05 *** 6.0E-01
POP.STRUCT2 7.9E-02 *** 2.7E-01 6.3E-02 *** 2.1E-01 5.8E-02 *** 2.0E-01
DEC2 -5.0E+00 *** -1.1E+00 -5.0E+00 *** -1.1E+00 -5.4E+00 *** -1.2E+00
SUBS:F.POT 1.2E-07 1.4E-02
SUBS:F.EQ 1.1E-06 *** 7.7E-02
SUBS:F.GIV 2.1E-05 5.9E-03
SUBS:F.REC 2.3E-05 3.0E-02
F.POT:DIR.DEM 1.3E-03 *** 6.4E-01
F.GIV:DIR.DEM 4.0E-02 ** 6.9E-02
F.REC:DIR.DEM 2.8E-05 9.3E-05
DIR.DEM:DEC 4.2E-01 *** 8.9E-01 1.2E-01 *** 2.6E-01 2.9E-01 *** 6.2E-01
I.STRUCT:P.HOUS 2.9E-01 *** 6.5E-01 2.0E-01 *** 4.5E-01 2.0E-01 *** 4.5E-01
Observation 114 114 114
L-Likelihood 384.1 374.9 372.2
*,**,*** Significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively.
a) Time dummies for the years 2004, 2003, 2002 and 2001 are not shown
b) Elasticities evaluated at sample means
negative coeﬃcient of DEC2).411
In addition, TAX shows the expected negative sign, suggesting that cantons with a low tax412
burden exhibit higher performance, a state of aﬀairs conducive to strong Tiebout competition.413
However, the positive sign of the quadratic term points to a rapidly diminishing eﬀect as soon414
as the tax burden starts to increase, with the critical value of 90.32 in model (A) and 100 in415
model (B), respectively (the average tax burden of Switzerland is set to 100). The positive sign416
of TAX found by De Borger and Kerstens (1996) therefore also holds for Switzerland as soon417
as it exceeds the average. Thus, both extremely low and high tax burdens cause eﬃciency gains,418
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because of tax competition on the one hand and because of increasing monitoring by citizens419
on the other.420
Finally, it is of interest for policy to know whether the determinants entering the new fiscal421
equalization formula (TOPOGR, I.STRUCT, and POP.STRUCT) to adjust for resource dispar-422
ities are relevant or not. The three variables are negatively related to DEA eﬃciency scores423
regardless of model specification. Therefore, the 2008 reform is likely to achieve its objective424
because it introduces exogenous factors in the equalization formula that seem to have a signif-425
icant influence on the heterogeneity of public good provision. Finally, the negative coeﬃcient426
of P.HOUS shows that the cost of housing factors into the cost of public services and hence427
ineﬃciency. Since it is largely exogenous, it could also be included in the fiscal equalization428
formula.429
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS430
The purpose of this paper was to measure eﬃciency in the provision of public services ap-431
plying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which maximizes the distance between an output432
bundle and an input bundle. The country analyzed is Switzerland, which is characterized by a433
high degree of federalism permitting Tiebout competition on the one hand and a sizable fiscal434
equalization program on the other. DEA shadow prices serve to derive the weights for aggre-435
gating the six public service categories into an overall output indicator for the 26 cantons, while436
inputs are equated to their real expenditure over the years 2000 to 2004. In a second step, DEA437
eﬃciency scores are related to the indicator ’financial potential’ which governs the Swiss fiscal438
equalization scheme designed to alleviate disparities between cantons.439
The main results are the following. First, eﬃciency scores indicate better performance of440
small rural cantons than of urban ones and are robust over the five years investigated. A compar-441
ison over the six service categories further shows that cantons with a high overall performance442
do not automatically outperform in all of them, preventing any one of them from becoming dom-443
inant in Tiebout competition. Second, financial equalization is negatively related to cantonal444
eﬃciency, with an especially marked eﬀect on payers. Schemes designed to mitigate disparities445
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that are deemed unacceptable not only by politicians but the citizenry as well (the pertinent446
constitutional amendment survived a popular referendum in the case of Switzerland) may thus447
have the undesirable side eﬀect of undermining incentives for eﬃciency. Jurisdictions who are448
payers and receivers both seek to keep their ’financial potential’ low – the former because this449
serves to ease their burden, the latter because they expect to receive more transfer payments and450
subsidies notably by producing public services at higher than minimum cost. Therefore, the451
equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ noted by Stiglitz (1988) seems indeed to exist in the case of Switzer-452
land. Third, earmarked federal subsidies (the main component of transfer payments prior to453
the 2008 reform) are negatively related to cantonal eﬃciency as well. Substitution of these ear-454
marked payments by freely disposable lump-sum ones as part of the new equalization program455
implemented in 2008 is therefore likely to enhance cantonal performance.456
This analysis suﬀers from several limitations. Above all, DEA eﬃciency scores constitute457
a technocratic measure, being silent on the question of whether the services provided reflect458
the preferences of citizens. Also, some of the explanatory variables used to predict eﬃciency459
scores may not be fully exogenous in the long term. In particular, INCOME possibly not only460
influences eﬃciency as a taste variable but could be the consequence of cantonal eﬃciency as461
well. In spite of these limitations, the analysis not only identifies the equity-eﬃciency trade-462
oﬀ that federally organized countries (such as Switzerland) face when implementing a fiscal463
equalization scheme but also provides guidance on how to structure it in terms of earmarked464
and freely disposable payments.465
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APPENDIX466
Table 4: Output indicators for the investigated six governmental activities
Public Service Output Description, remarks
Administration
Legislative, Executive β1 Population Population served and number of firms serve as
proxies for administration services provided.General administration β2 No. firms
Public safety
Police β1 Population The assumption is that citizens have the same
preferences for public safety and a similar prob-
ability of suﬀering from crime.
Judicature β2 No. delinquencies Total annual number of delinquencies reported by
police.
Fire department β3 No. dwelling units The assumption is that the fire risk is the same
across dwelling units.
Education
Kindergarden β1 No. students The numbers of kindergarten, primary, secondary
and high school students serve as indicators of
output values. Quality of education is neglected
because of lacking annual data.
Primary education β2 No. students
Secondary education β3 No. students
High school education β4 No. students
Health
Hospitals (specialized) β1 No. patient cases Case-mix adjusted number of cases serve as a
severity-adjusted output.Hospitals (primary) β2 No. patient cases
Hospitals (psychiatric) β3 No. patient days The output of rehabilitation and psychiatric
clinics, nursing homes, and retirement homes is
measured by the number of patient days. No
quality adjustment was possible because of
lacking data.
Rehab clinics β4 No. patient days
Nursing homes β5 No. patient days
Retirement homes β6 No. patient days
Transportation
Cantonal roads β1 Road length Maintenance only.
Communal roads β2 Road length Maintenance only.
Road utilization β3 No. cars Registered number of cars is used as an utilization
indicator.
Public economy
Farming
β1 Farming area The assumption is that farming areas serve recre-
ation purposes.
β2 Mountain area The share of mountain area and organic farming
area adjusts for diﬀerences in quality.β3 Organic area
Forestry β4 Forest area in The assumption is that forest areas serve recre-
ation purposes.
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Table 6: Output performance indicators Ψ ji , 26 Cantons (2004)
Cantons (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ZH 804351 609182 1438309 2414338 293337 182691
BE 608731 467307 1018589 2279872 270257 535600
LU 226021 160632 534219 490410 84259 187310
UR 22354 16503 49531 39184 12713 26513
SZ 87616 61522 175165 128367 37009 73474
OW 21130 17194 46818 33907 11161 34362
NW 28856 17994 48612 35418 10613 20764
GL 25754 19353 51962 61451 10999 29547
ZG 128873 47613 134137 132750 27843 31162
FR 160165 113271 363600 343419 75380 180878
SO 157621 112625 312784 269547 65085 85709
BS 123028 104393 232726 634082 31674 1302
BL 169043 120690 383400 317776 62031 58940
SH 47015 34727 96062 113555 31302 36222
AR 33668 24723 74755 99397 17765 43370
AI 10082 7635 29755 15113 4366 24714
SG 292344 208803 620278 668789 108448 205445
GR 120802 130689 221249 300494 97956 306163
AG 360075 255663 858094 691775 145986 146288
TG 148445 105537 332003 360721 71424 117408
TI 220732 185993 420807 654548 100196 84566
VD 413159 327087 986906 1411360 188657 274138
VS 183488 174242 399383 459095 134423 138802
NE 106986 80628 270524 284766 44079 91707
GE 288564 204038 635494 1508138 106019 24811
JU 44022 31404 95142 121188 29632 106580
(1) Administration, (2) Public safety, (3) Education,
(4) Health, (5) Transportation, (6) Public economy
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